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Introduction
In this paper we present an equi1ibrium mode1 of a dual 1abor market in which firms endogenous1y separate into two sectors, even though the firms are identica1 ~ ante. In the primary see tor effort requirements are high, jobs are monitored, and workers are commensurate1y rewarded, whi1e in the secondary sector effort requirements are low, monitoring is lax, and workers are poor1y paid.
Our mode1 is motivated in part byaresurgenee of empirica1 interest in dualism in the 1abor market and in part by the recognition that an efficiency wage mode1 might be ab1e to provide a theoretica1 underpinning for dual 1abor markets, heretofore an almost purely empirica1 construct. Empirica1 work supporting a dual 1abor market view of the US economy is presented in Dickens and Lang [1985] ; Heckman and Hotz [1986] take a position strong1y to the contrary. Regard1ess of one's position on the controversy, the point is that this old question is once again being debated in the mainstream journals. This empirica1 revival u1timate1y has its roots in theoretica1 deve1opments. Proponents of efficiency wage models tend to view that theoryas a usefu1 too1 for exp1aining the "rigidities" that used to be 1arge1y in the domain of old-sty1e macroeconomists and "institutiona1ists." In that spirit Bu10w and Summers [1986] constructed an efficiency wage theory of dual 1abor markets, a concept which, prior to their paper, was located square1y in the institutiona1ist bai1iwick. In their mode1 the techno1ogy associated with a particular job is specified exogenous1y. Assuming the existence of two types of jobs (secondary see tor jobs, which are sufficient1y menia1 as to not require supervision, and primary sector jobs in which supervision is required ), they use efficiency wage theory to exp1ain how an outcome in which equa11y ski11ed workers are paid different wages can pers ist as an equi1ibrium.
Our approach is complementary to that of Bulow and Summers. Rather than exploring the implications of an assumed technological dual ity , we instead generate that duality as an equilibrium outcome. Our approach thus addresses the obvious question that is begged in Bulow and Summers, name ly , why there should be two as opposed to one or "many" or a continuum of j ob types. I t is also consistent with the institutionalist dual labor market literature, which emphasizes the endogeneity of technology choice.
The key assumption behind our dual labor market outcome is a nonconvexity in the monitoring technology. It is this nonconvexity that allows firms, all identical in the sense of have access to the same technology, to be indifferent in equilibrium between offering the two job types. Specifically, we assume that a firm can observe costlessly whether its workers are exerting effort at an exogenously specified minimum level, but that effort above the minimum level can be monitored only imperfectly and at a cost. This is consistent with intuition: one can observe costlessly whether the receptionist is answering the telephone; observing whether he or she is more or less helpful to those who call requires the expenditure of time and effort.
Like Bulow and Summers, we use the Shapiro and Stiglitz [1984] model, one of the standards of the efficiency wage literature, as our starting point. However, our setup differs from that of Shapiro and Stiglitzz in one significant respect in that we allow for heterogeneity among workers. Workers are not assumed to be heterogeneous with respect to their abilities since we want to pre serve the Bulow and Summers outcome that in equilibrium equally skilled workers are paid different wages on different jobs. Instead, we assume workers differ according to the value placed on leisure. This assumed heterogeneity leads to a search equilibrium with two realistic properties: not all workers will accept secondary see tor jobs, and some primary sector workers will shirk.
The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows. In the next section we set out the decision problem faced by workers. A worker has two choices to make. First, if unemployed and offered a job, he or she must decide whether to accept the job or remain unemployed. Second, if employed on a job with an effort requirement, the worker must decide whether to shirk or work. A job is distinguished by its wage offer, its effort requirement and a match-specific nonpecuniary component. We show that the job acceptance decision depends on the wage and the nonpecuniary component, while the shirkjwork decision also depends on the effort requirement. Both decisions depend on the worker's type.
Our analysis of worker decisions is used in Section 3 to characterize the probabilities entering the firm's decision problem, name ly , the probability that its job offer will be accepted and the probability that a worker, having accepted the job, will meet its effort requirement. These probabilities depend on the distribution of wagejeffort requirement packages extant in the market and on the distribution of worker types across the unemployed. The firm's decision problem is discussed in Section 4. A firm can observe costlessly whether its workers are exerting effort at the exogenously specified minimum level, but effort above this minimum cannot be monitored perfeetly. The monitoring technology is exogenous: the cost of monitoring and the rate at which shirkers are detected are parameters of the firm's problem. Workers who are monitored and found to be putting forth less than the required level of effort are fired. The firm's problem is to decide what wage to offer, whether to monitor or not, and if it does monitor, what effort requirement to set. We establish that if a firm monitors, it never sets an effort requirement at or arbitrarily close to the minimum effort level. This implies that an equilibrium in which some firms monitor while others do not involves "separation"; ie, such an equilibrium must exhibit "dualism."
We construct the equilibrium of the model in Section 5. An equilibrium is a distribution of wages and effort requirements across vacancies together with a corresponding distribution of individual types across unemployed workers.
This equilibrium is explicitly Nash: wages and effort requirements are set optimally by firms in conjunction with optimal search and effort decisions by workers. We focus on symmetric equilibria, ie, those in which firms that choose to monitor offer a common wagejeffort requirement package and firms that choose not to monitor offer a common wage. A symmetric equilibrium is characterized by four variables, the wage for non-monitoring firms, the wage and effort requirement for monitoring firms, and the fraction of vacancies arising in firms that monitor. Three types of symmetric equilibria can arise: (i) pure secondary sector equilibria in which no firms monitor, (ii) pure primary sector equilibria in which all firms monitor, and (iii) dual labor market equilibria in which both types of behavior are optimal. We prove the existence of symmetric equilibria and show that dual labor market equilibria will arise given appropriate values for the eos t of monitoring and the rate at which shirkers can be detected. Such equilibria will involve separation: the effort requirement of primary see tor firms will not be arbitrarily close to that of secondary see tor firms.
In sum, efficiency wage and search considerations lead to an equilibrium in which firms having access to the same technology ~ ante choose to produce output in two distinct sectors. Secondary see tor firms offer lower wages and do not monitor, while firms in the primary sector monitor their workers and pay a higher wage in order to elicit greater productivity. This result is discussed in the final section.
Workers
We begin with the decision problem faced by workers. This decision problem has two aspects. First, if unemp10yed and offered a job paying a wage of w, providing a nonpecuniary benefit of ~,l and requiring an effort of e, ie, a "(w,~,e) job," does the worker accept or reject the offer? Second, if the offer is accepted, does the worker shirk or meet the job's effort requirement? The decision ru1es determining these choices vary with the worker's va1ue of 1eisure, which is the worker's private information. The va1ue of 1eisure, B, varies across workers according to the continuous1y differentiab1e density, f(B). This density and g(~), 1ikewise a continuous1y differentiab1e density, are the fundamental exogenous elements of our mode1 and are assumed to be common knowledge.
We examine worker behavior using three va1ue functions: (i) the va1ue of meeting the effort requirement on a (w,~,e) job, (ii) the va1ue of shirking on a (w,~,e) job, and (iii) the va1ue of unemp1oyment. These va1ue functions vary with the worker's typ e , B. We estab1ish four resu1ts in this section. First, we prove that the worker's problem is we11-posed, ie, we verify that the three va1ue functions are defined by contractions. Second, we show that the decision to accept or reject a job offer is independent of the job's effort requirement; ie, the job acceptance decision depends on1y on w and ~ and on the worker's type, B. Third, for given w and B, there is a critica1 va1ue of ~ such that lUpon rece~v~ng a job offer, the worker discovers the va1ue of its nonpecuniary component, ~. The random variable ~ is iid across matches, is independent of the worker's va1ue of 1eisure, and its rea1ization is the worker's private information. Its inc1usion in the mode1 is required for the existence of symmetric equi1ibrium; without ~, the firms' payoff functions fai1 to be concave in the wage and effort requirement. This point is discussed in the context of equi1ibrium search theory in Albrecht and Vroman [1989] . jobs offering w with an associated e greater than or equal to this critical value are accepted by workers of type O; jobs with a lower e are rejected. We show that this critical value is continuously differentiable, decreasing in w, and increasing in O. Finally, for given w, e, and O, there is an analogous critical value of e for the work/shirk decision. A worker of type O meets the effort requirement on a (w,e,e) job if e is greater than or equal to this critical value; otherwise the worker shirks. We show that this critical value is also continuously differentiable in its arguments, decreasing in w, and increasing in e and O.
The details of the model are as follows. Workers live forever. Time is continuous, and the future is discounted at the rate r. Utility is derived from the rate at which income and nonpecuniary benefits are received and disutility from the rate at which effort is expended. The rate at which effort is supplied is a choice variable, bounded below by the minimum level, which we normalize to 1;2 the effort level is zero for the unemployed. A worker employed on a (w,e,e) job and meeting the effort requirement enjoys an instantaneous utility of w + e -e; ie, the worker's utility in an interval of time of length ~t is given by [w + e -e]~t + o(~t). If the worker shirks on that job, his or her * * instantaneous utility is given by w + e -e, where e < e. Finally, unemployment generates an instantaneous utility of O.
A worker on a (w,e,e) job must decide what effort rate to supply. A worker not meeting the effort requirement faces a separation risk of p; ie, the probability of a separation in an interval of time of length ~t equals p~t + o(~t). This separation risk is independent of how far below the requirement the 2We also assume that there is an upper bound on effort. This natural assumption ensures that the set of policies open to the firm is compact, as will be required by our existence proof.
worker's effort falls; so, if a worker decides to shirk, he or she never exerts more than the minimum level of effort, * ie, e requirement suffers a separation risk of o < ~.
A worker meeting the effort
The worker's effort choice is then simply one of whether or not to shirk.
The value of not shirking on a (w,€,e) job is:
The non-shirking worker gets an instantaneous uti1ity of (w+€-e)~t + o(~t).
With probability o~t + o(~t) the worker loses the job, in which case he or she becomes unemployed with associated va1ue U(O); otherwise the value VN(w,€,e;O) is retained. Rearranging, dividing through by ~t, and taking the limit as ~t~O yields:
The corresponding va1ue of shirking is:
The job's effort requirement does not enter V S (·). Note that if the firm sets e -1, the shirk/no-shirk distinction disappears. The separation risk is o, and the value of having the job is given by (1) with e = 1.
Next, consider an unemp10yed worker. Suppose job offers arrive at the rate Q. This arrival rate is exogenous and reflects the underlying matching technology. Then the value of unemployment to a worker of type O is: Since V N (·) and V S (·) depend on U(·), they a1so depend on H(w,e) and G(e).
We now verify that the worker's decision problem is we11-defined.
Proposition 1: For any joint distribution H(w,e) across vacancies coupled with any G(e) and for any offer arrival rate a, there exist unique va1ue functions Proof: Given in the Appendix.
The expression for U(O) given by (3) incorporates the worker's job acceptance decision ru1e: a (w,e,e) job is accepted iff A(w,e,e;O) ~ U(O). We can now show:
The job acceptance decision is independent of the job's effort requirement.
Proof: Given in the Appendix.
A worker accepts a job if either VN(w,e,e;O) ~ U(O) or VS(w,e;O) ~ U(O).
Since the condition VS(w,e;O) ~ U(O) is more easi1y satisfied than VN(w,e,e;O)
~ U(8), the acceptance decision is determined on1y by w and e. The intuition for this resu1t is as fo11ows. Consider a worker on the acceptjreject margin.
If the worker accepts the job, it is a matter of indifference to the worker whether the job is retained or lost. He or she therefore has no incentive to put forth the required effort. s
The "acceptance condition" (AC) is thus V S (w,e;8) ~ U(O), ie:
Let eA(w,O) be defined by:
that is, eA(w,O) is the acceptance va1ue of e for a person of type O SThis is similar to the "Dougal resu1t," established in Burdett and Mortensen [1980] . They show that the 1ayoff risk on a margina11y acceptable job does not inf1uence the chance that such a job is accepted. Proof: Given in the Appendix.
The second aspect of the worker's decision problem, the shirk/no-shirk decision, is characterized by an analogous critica1 va1ue. The "no-shirk condition" (6) NSC:
(NSC) is V N (w,e,e;8) ~ V S (w,e;8);
w + e ~ rU(8) + 1 + (r+~)(e_1).
~-S
Let e N (w,e,8) be defined by: We a1so need to examine the properties of e N (w,e,8), as this critica1
va1ue is key to the second probabi1ity entering the firm's decision, the probabi1ity that a worker who accepts the job will meet its effort requirement. 4
Proposition 4: The critica1 va1ue e N (w,e,8) is continuous1y differentiab1e in its arguments, decreasing in w, and increasing in e and 8.
4Since e N (w,e,8) > e A (w,8) for all e > 1, the shirk/no-shirk and acceptance decisions are independent in the sense that the unconditiona1 probabi1ity that a worker will meet the effort requirement on an offered job is the same as the probabi1ity that he or she will meet that requirement conditiona1 on acceptance.
The Acceptance and No-Shirk Probabilities
In the preceding section we developed two critical values to characterize worker decision rules. In this section we use these critical values to develop expressions for the probabilities entering the firm's problem. Let q(w) denote the probability that an applicant accepts a job offering a wage of w, and let p(w,e) be the probability that an applicant who accepts the job meets its effort requirement. The acceptance probability is given by one minus the distribution function of € evaluated at €A(w,8) and integrated against the density of 8 among the unemployed, ie,
The no-shirk probability is given by the same expression, evaluated at €N(w,e,8) and similarly integrated against f U (8). That is,
The acceptance probability is a function of w alone, while the no-shirk probability depends on both w and e. The applicant's two decisions depend on €;
however, q(w) and p(w,e) are probabilities viewed from the firm's point of view, and € is not under the firm's control. Indeed, the nonpecuniary component is the worker's private information.
A key point in deriving q(w) and p(w,e) is that the density function of 8 among the unemployed, f U (8), and the corresponding population density, f(8),
are not the same. Individuals with higher values of 8 are overrepresented among the unemployed since they are more likely to shirk (and be fired) and less likely to accept a given job. By definition:
By Bayes Rule:
where u(O) is the O-specific unemp10yment rate and u -JU(O)f(O)dO is the overall unemp10yment rate.
The derivation of u(O) is tedious and is given in the Appendix. We show that: Proof: Given in the Appendix.
From Propositions 3, 4, and 5, we have the fo11owing resu1ts:
Proposition 6: The acceptance probabi1ity q(w) is continuous1y differentiab1e
and increasing.
Proposition 7: The no-shirk probabi1ity p(w,e) is continuous1y differentiab1e in both its arguments, increasing in w, and decreasing in e.
Proposition 7 shows that our mode1 has a standard efficiency wage propert y , name ly , higher wages reduce shirking. is negative.
The minimum effort level can be ensured costlessly in alloccupied jobs.
If a firm chooses to impose no effort requirement, it need on1y decide upon a wage offer. A wage offer of w will be accepted with probability q(w). If the wage offer is accepted, then the value to the firm of having a worker in that job is:
This value is the sum of the instantaneous return, 1-w-c, realized over the interval of time 6t, and the future value. With probability 1-S6t+O(6t) the firm retains the worker and the associated value R(w). Otherwise, the firm loses the worker, and the job becomes vacant with associated value n. Passing to the limit in the usual way gives:
With probability 1-q(w) the firm's wage offer is rejected. In this case the firm retains the value of a vacancy, n. Thus, a firm that imposes no effort requirement chooses w to solve:
w Alternatively, a firm might attempt to aehieve a higher 1eve1 of effort on its jobs. In order to e1ieit a 1evel of effort above the minimum, a firm must monitor. Monitoring entai1s a fixed eost ineurred at the rate m whi1e the job is oeeupied and enab1es the firm to deteet shirking, a1beit not neeessari1y immediate1y.5 As diseussed above, a shirking worker on a monitored job suffers a separation risk of p > o.
Consider a firm using the monitoring teehno1ogy, offering a wage of w, and imposing an effort requirement of e. The firm's wage offer is aeeepted and the effort requirement is met with probabi1ity p(w,e). With probabi1ity q(w) -p(w,e) the job is aeeepted and the worker shirks. Finally, 1 -q(w) is the probability that the firm's offer is rejeeted.
The va1ue of having a non-shirker on a (w,e) job is: 
where: 5We assume that eaeh firm is suffieient1y large as to preelude using its total output to infer whether a worker on a partieular job is shirking or not.
6The arrival rate, A, is endogenous. Its determination is diseussed below. is the value to a firm of meeting a job applieant. The firm's deeision of whether to monitor or not is ineorporated in the value B. In the limit:
We can now verify that the firm's deeision problem is well-posed.
Proposition 8: There exist unique value funetions R(w), N(w,e), S(w), and IT.
We can also establish that if a firm decides to monitor, it never sets an effort requirement at or arbitrarily elose to the minimum level, e = 1.
Proposition 9: If a firm ehooses to monitor, it sets an effort requirement no less than l+m.
Proposition 9 implies that if some firms are monitoring while others are not, then any equilibrium must involve "separation." Thus, equilibria in whieh there is a eontinuum of job types are ruled out. That is, even if a eontinuum of wage/effort requirement packages were offered in the primary sector, the lowest effort requirement would not be arbitrarily elose to the minimum (seeondary sector) effort requirement, ie, the equilibrium will exhibit dualism.
Thus far, our diseussion of firm behavior has been limited to jobs "in the market." To eomplete the firm side of the model we invoke the free entry/exit condition. A firm ereates jobs so long as the value of a vaeaney, IT, is positive; a firm eliminates vaeaneies from the market if IT < O. This free entry/exit eondition implies that IT must be zero in equilibrium. From equation (19) this eondition also determines the equilibrium applieant arrival rate, namely:
(20) A = e/B.
Eguilibrium
In the preceding sections we characterized optimal behavior for workers in the face of any arbitrary distribution H(w,e) of offers across vacancies and for firms in the face of any arbitrary distribution F U (8) of worker types across the unemp1oyed. An equi1ibrium is a distribution H(w,e) together with a corresponding distribution F U (8) that is Nash in the sense that H(w,e) ref1ects the optimizing behavior of firms given F U (8), while at the same time F U (8)
reflects the optimizing behavior of workers given H(w,e).
The most general equilibria to consider are those in which some firms monitor and some do not. The possibility that a variety of wage/effort requirement packages might be offered by primary see tor firms and that such dispersion might be self-supporting in equilibrium is not ruled out ~ priori.
However, we focus our attention on symmetric equilibria. A symmetric equilibrium is one in which those firms that choose to monitor offer a common wage/effort requirement package; likewise, firms that choose not to monitor offer a common wage. Given suitable restrictions on the underlying exogenous distributions, we prove the existence of symmetric equilibria.
We denote the common primary see tor package by (wp,e p ), the wage offered To prove the existence of a symmetric equilibrium we construct a map that takes any initial symmetric distribution HO(w,e) into a new symmetric distribution H 1 (w,e). To use Brouwer's Theorem to show that this map has a fixed point, we must establish that the map is continuous and defined on a compact set. As we have assumed an upper bound on effort, the set of possible quadruples {w S ' w p , ep' ~} is closed and bounded. Thus, to prove existence we need to prove continuity.
The map taking HO to Hl has three basic components. First, optimal behavior by workers generates the contaminated distribution F U (8) and the probabilities q(w) and p(w,e) that enter firms' decisions. Second, given q(w) and p(w,e), firms compute the optimal secondary sector wage offer, w S ' and the optimal primary sector package (wp,e p ). Finally, given the updated (w S ' w p ' ep)' firms optimally allocate vacancies across sectors, producing an updated value of ~.
The continuity of the map taking HO to Hl is established by demonstrating the continuity of each step. Thus, we need to first demonstrate the continuity of F U (8) and of q(w) and p(w,e) in the variables comprising HO Second, we need to demonstrate the continuity of the optimal secondary sector and primary sector choices in the variables comprising HO. To do this we show that these optimizing values are unique, so that the Maximum Theorem can be applied to establish continuity. Finally, given optimal behavior in both sectors, we need to show that optimal sectoral choice generates a unique ~. These results are given in the following three propositions. and/or increasing m produces a dual market equilibrium.
Conclusion
In this paper we present a model in which a dualIabor market arises as a Nash equilibrium. A key feature of our setup is that firms are identical ~
ante. This distinguishes our model from that of Bulow and Summers [1986] in which the technology choices of firms are specified exogenously. While our approach complements that of Bulow and Summers, the endogeneity of technology choice makes our model consistent with an important theme of the institutionalist dual labor market literature.
Our equilibrium rests on both efficiency wage and equilibrium search considerations. This combination produces a useful extension of the basic Shapiro/Stiglitz model. In contrast to Shapiro/Stiglitz and Bulow/Summers, shirking by some, but not all, workers is a feature of our equilibrium. Of course, shirking in equilibrium follows in our model from the assumed heterogeneity of workers. Our model thus shows how some simple tools from equilibrium search theory can be used to incorporate worker heterogeneity into the Shapiro/Stiglitz model.
In proving existence we worked with symmetric equilibria. Whether asymmetric equilibria exist in this model is an open question. However, our focus on symmetric equilibria is not essential to the dual labor market result.
Even if we were to allow for the possibility of a range of (w,e) combinations among "primary sector" firms, Proposition 9 establishes the required separation. The gap between the lowest primary see tor effort requirement and the minimum effort level is ensured by the assumed nonconvexity in the monitoring technology.
This nonconvexity in the monitoring technology is the key assumption in our model. In the interest of making our point as cleanly as possible, the nonconvexity we used was a very stylized one. It is clear, however, that any fixed cost associated with setting up the monitoring technology could yield a dual outcome. Our model thus provides a theoretical basis for an essentially empirical construct that has been used by many labor economists. Although we have limited our attention to establishing the logical coherence of the setup, ie, to estab1ishing the existence of equi1ibrium, the mode1 cou1d, with suitab1e modification, be used to analyze policy questions within a dual 1abor market context. For examp1e, the effects of a minimum wage on the primary sector package and on the sizes of the two sectors could be examined.
Our model cou1d be extended and refined in severa1 directions. A particular1y interesting possibility wou1d be to explore the consequences of allowing firms to offer a menu of choices to workers, ie, to allow workers to se1f-se1ect. However, even without extensions, the model performs its basic function of estab1ishing the possibi1ity of an endogenous1y generated dual 1abor market outcome.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1: Substituting (1) and (2) into (3) Using (1) and (2) proof of Proposition 3 we showed that rU'(O) > O for allO. OED.
Derivation of u(O)
We use steady-state f10w conditions to derive the O-specific unemployment rates. For each O, (i) the rates of flow of nonshirkers into and out of unemployment must be equal and (ii) the corresponding rates for shirkers must also be equal. Let neO) denote the probability that an individual of type O is employed and not shirking; let s(O) be the probability that he or she is employed and shirking. 
These two steady-state conditions, plus the identity n(O)+s(O)+u(O) In fact, the monitoring firm will have to set whigher than the non-monitoring firm or all its workers will shirk, so that e can never be less than l + m.
QED. 
Proof of Proposition

